For providers

VMware released a security advisory to address multiple vulnerabilities in Aria Operations for Networks. A cyber threat actor could exploit one of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system. CISA encourages users and administrators to review VMware security advisory VMSA-2024-0002 and apply the necessary updates.

Today, CISA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure alongside supplemental Joint Guidance: Identifying and Mitigating Living off the Land Techniques. The following federal agencies and international organizations are additional co-authors on the joint advisory and guidance: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD’s) Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) a part of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK) New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) Volt Typhoon actors are seeking to pre-position themselves—using living off the land (LOTL) techniques—on IT networks for disruptive or destructive cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States. The advisory provides actionable information from U.S. incident response activity that can help all organizations: Recognize Volt Typhoon techniques, Assess whether Volt Typhoon techniques have compromised your organization, Secure your networks from these adversarial techniques by implementing recommended mitigations. To supplement the advisory, the Joint Guidance provides threat detection information and mitigations applicable to LOTL activity, regardless of threat actor. Additionally, CISA has published Secure by Design Alert: Security Design Improvements for SOHO Device Manufacturers, which provides technology manufactures guidance on protecting their products from Volt Typhoon compromises. CISA and its partners strongly urge critical infrastructure organizations and technology manufacturers to read the joint advisory and guidance to defend against this threat. For more information on People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actors, visit People's Republic of China Cyber Threat. To learn more about secure by design principles and practices, visit Secure by Design.

Notification This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise. This document is marked TLP:CLEAR--Recipients may share this information without restriction. Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:CLEAR information may be shared without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp. Summary Description CISA received three files for analysis obtained from a critical infrastructure compromised by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber group known as Volt Typhoon. The submitted files enable discovery and command-and-control (C2): (1) An open source Fast Reverse Proxy Client (FRPC) tool used to open a reverse proxy between the compromised system and a Volt Typhoon C2 server; (2) a Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) that can be used to reveal servers situated behind a network firewall or obscured through Network Address Translation (NAT); and (3) a publicly available port scanner called ScanLine. For more information on Volt Typhoon see, joint Cybersecurity Advisory PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise, and Maintain Persistent Access to, U.S. Critical Infrastructure. For more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories, webpage. Download the PDF version of this report: MAR-10448362-1.v1 Volt Typhoon (PDF, 450.82 KB ) For a downloadable copy of IOCs associated with this MAR in JSON format, see: AR24-038A STIX JSON (JSON, 59.40 KB ) Submitted Files (3) 99b80c5ac352081a64129772ed5e1543d94cad708ba2adc46dc4ab7a0bd563f1 (SMSvcService.exe) eaef901b31b5835035b75302f94fee27288ce46971c6db6221ecbea9ba7ff9d0 (eaef901b31b5835035b75302f94fee...) edc0c63065e88ec96197c8d7a40662a15a812a9583dc6c82b18ecd7e43b13b70 (BrightmetricAgent.exe) IPs (2) 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 203[.]95[.]9[.]54 Findings edc0c63065e88ec96197c8d7a40662a15a812a9583dc6c82b18ecd7e43b13b70 Tags obfuscatedproxytrojanutility Details --> Name BrightmetricAgent.exe Size 2840064 bytes Type PE32+ executable (console) x86-64 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows MD5 fd41134e8ead1c18ccad27c62a260aa6 SHA1 04423659f175a6878b26ac7d6b6e47c6fd9194d1 SHA256 edc0c63065e88ec96197c8d7a40662a15a812a9583dc6c82b18ecd7e43b13b70 SHA512 df55591e730884470afba688e17c83fafb157ecf94c9f10a20e21f229434ea58b59f8eb771f8f9e29993f43f4969fe66dd913128822b534c9b1a677453dbb93c ssdeep 49152:99z0w/qP1dKPzeietmd64H9QaIG0aYkn0GzkWVISaJUET6qyxASuOszP7hn+S6wB:v0R9dKSiekd68ZIQ0obVI9UG6qyuhF6 Entropy 7.999902 Malware Result unknown Antivirus Adaware Generic.Trojan.Volt.Marte.A.05F91E9C Antiy GrayWare/Win32.Kryptik.ffp Bitdefender Generic.Trojan.Volt.Marte.A.05F91E9C Emsisoft Generic.Trojan.Volt.Marte.A.05F91E9C (B) ESET a variant of WinGo/HackTool.Agent.Y trojan IKARUS Trojan.WinGo.Rozena Microsoft Defender Malware Sophos App/FRProxy-F Varist W64/Agent.FXW.gen!Eldorado YARA Rules No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. Relationships edc0c63065... Connected_To 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 Description This artifact is a cross platform full featured FRP that is written in GO language (Golang) and packed using Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX). This utility can be used to locate servers behind a network firewall or obscured through NAT. It includes the KCP (no acronym) network protocol that allows for error-checked and anonymous delivery of data streams using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) with packet level encryption support. The program contains two different multiplexer libraries that can bi-directionally stream data over a NAT’d network. It also contains a command line interface (CLI) library that can leverage command shells such as PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and Z Shell (zsh). In addition, the utility features a unique capability that detects if the utility is executed from the command line or by double-clicking. By default it is configured to connect to the Internet Protocol (IP) address, 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 1080. It must receive a specially formed packet from the C2 for the utility to deploy on the system. 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 Tags proxy Ports 1080 TCP Whois Domain Name: pdsguam.biz Registry Domain ID: D15926452-BIZ Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com Registrar URL: whois.godaddy.com Updated Date: 2023-06-15T04:28:19Z Creation Date: 2007-01-10T00:40:37Z Registry Expiry Date: 2024-01-09T23:59:59Z Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC Registrar IANA ID: 146 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505 Registrant Organization: Domains By Proxy, LLC Registrant State/Province: Arizona Registrant Country: US Registrant Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name. Admin Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name. Tech Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name. Name Server: ns.pdsguam.biz Name Server: ns2.pdsguam.biz DNSSEC: unsigned Relationships 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 Connected_From edc0c63065e88ec96197c8d7a40662a15a812a9583dc6c82b18ecd7e43b13b70 Description BrightmetricAgent.exe (edc0c63065...) attempts to connect to this IP address. The IP address hosts a proxy server. eaef901b31b5835035b75302f94fee27288ce46971c6db6221ecbea9ba7ff9d0 Tags puptrojan Details --> Name eaef901b31b5835035b75302f94fee27288ce46971c6db6221ecbea9ba7ff9d0 Size 20480 bytes Type PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, UPX compressed MD5 3a97d9b6f17754dcd38ca7fc89caab04 SHA1 ffb1d8ea3039d3d5eb7196d27f5450cac0ea4f34 SHA256 eaef901b31b5835035b75302f94fee27288ce46971c6db6221ecbea9ba7ff9d0 SHA512 d99941e4445efed5d4e407f91a9e5bba08d1be3f0dab065d1bfb4e70ab48d6526a730233d6889ba58de449f622e6a14e99dab853d40fc30a508627fd2735c973 ssdeep 384:ahXoLj9Zez0Bm4SUZa8WLLXyjSL2RtfAwj/yneIMUogQ:ahXoLhZez0m4SIabLLCmL2Rvj/yeIEg Entropy 7.297754 Malware Result unknown Antivirus AhnLab Unwanted/Win32.Foundstone Antiy HackTool[NetTool]/Win32.Portscan ClamAV Win.Trojan.Scanline-1 Comodo ApplicUnwnt Cylance Malware Filseclab Hacktool.ScanLine.a.fsff IKARUS Virtool Microsoft Defender Malware NANOAV Riskware.Win32.ScanLine.dhhus Quick Heal Trojan.Win32 Scrutiny Malware Sophos App/ScanLn-A VirusBlokAda Trojan.Genome.fl Zillya! Tool.Portscan.Win32.77 YARA Rules No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. Description This artifact is a command-line port scanning utility from Foundstone, Inc. called ScanLine, which is packed using UPX. It is used to scan for open UDP and TCP ports, grab banners from open ports, resolve IP addresses to host names, and bind to specified ports and IP addresses. Screenshots 99b80c5ac352081a64129772ed5e1543d94cad708ba2adc46dc4ab7a0bd563f1 Tags obfuscated, proxy, trojan Details --> Name SMSvcService.exe Size 3712512 bytes Type PE32+ executable (console) x86-64 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows MD5 b1de37bf229890ac181bdef1ad8ee0c2 SHA1 ffdb3cc7ab5b01d276d23ac930eb21ffe3202d11 SHA256 99b80c5ac352081a64129772ed5e1543d94cad708ba2adc46dc4ab7a0bd563f1 SHA512 e41df636a36ac0cce38e7db5c2ce4d04a1a7f9bc274bdf808912d14067dc1ef478268035521d0d4b7bcf96facce7f515560b38a7ebe47995d861b9c482e07e25 ssdeep 98304:z2eyMq4PuR5d7wgdo0OFfnFJkEUCGdaQLhpYYEfRTl6sysy:ryxzbdo0ifnoEOdz9pY7j5 Entropy 7.890436 Malware Result unknown Antivirus Adaware Generic.Trojan.Volt.Marte.A.105C517F AhnLab HackTool/Win.Frpc Antiy GrayWare/Win32.Kryptik.ffp Bitdefender Generic.Trojan.Volt.Marte.A.105C517F Emsisoft Generic.Trojan.Volt.Marte.A.105C517F (B) ESET a variant of WinGo/Riskware.Frp.U application IKARUS Trojan.WinGo.Shellcoderunner Microsoft Defender Malware Sophos App/FRProxy-F Varist W64/Agent.FXW.gen!Eldorado YARA Rules No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. PE Metadata Compile Date 1970-01-01 00:00:00+00:00 Import Hash 6ed4f5f04d62b18d96b26d6db7c18840 PE Sections MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy 7f8e8722da728b6e834260b5a314cbac header 512 2.499747 d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e UPX0 0 0.000000 f9943591918adeeeee7da80e4d985a49 UPX1 3711488 7.890727 5c0061445ac2f8e6cadf694e54146914 UPX2 512 1.371914 Relationships 99b80c5ac3... Connected_To 203[.]95[.]9[.]54 Description This artifact is a 64-bit Windows executable file that is packed using UPX. This packed file contains a compiled version of an open-source tool published on GitHub called "FRPC". The "FRPC" is a command-line tool written in Golang that is designed to open a reverse proxy between the compromised system and the TA's C2 server. When the "FRPC" is installed and executed on the compromised system, it attempts to establish a connection with the Fast Reverse Proxy Server (FRPS) using the reverse proxy method to allow the TA to control the compromised system. This "FRPC" application supports encryption, compression, and allows easy token authentication. It also supports the protocols below: --Begin protocols-- Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) User Datagram Protocol (UDP) An alternative Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) An alternative Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) --End protocols-- Displayed below is the "FRPC" tool configuration that contains the network communication method, the remote "FRPS" server's public Internet Protocol (IP) address and port numbers: --Begin configuration-- [common] server_addr = 192.168.18.111 server_port = 8081 server_addrs = 203[.]95[.]9[.]54,203[.]95[.]9[.]54,203[.]95[.]9[.]54 server_ports = 8443,8443,8443 token = 1kyRdFmuk0i25JbCJmtift1c9VA05VBS protocol = tcp tls_enable = true disable_custom_tls_first_byte = true log_level = debug [plugin_socks5] type = tcp remote_port = 1080 plugin = socks5 use_encryption = true use_compression = true --End configuration-- Displayed below are the command-line usages and flags of the "FRPC" tool: --Begin usages and flags-- Usage: frpc [flags] frpc [command] Available Commands: help Help about any command tcp Run frpc with a single tcp proxy udp Run frpc with a single udp proxy verify Verify that the configures is valid Flags: -c, --config string config file of frpc (default "./frpc.ini") -h, --help help for frpc -v, --version version of frpc Use "frpc [command] --help" for more information about a command. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Run frpc with a single tcp proxy Usage: frpc tcp [flags] Flags: --disable_log_color disable log color in console -h, --help help for tcp -i, --local_ip string local ip (default "127.0.0.1") -l, --local_port int local port --log_file string console or file path (default "console") --log_level string log level (default "info") --log_max_days int log file reversed days (default 3) -p, --protocol string tcp or kcp or websocket (default "tcp") -n, --proxy_name string proxy name -r, --remote_port int remote port -s, --server_addr string frp server's address (default "127.0.0.1:7000") --tls_enable enable frpc tls -t, --token string auth token --uc use compression --ue use encryption -u, --user string user Global Flags: -c, --config string config file of frpc (default "./frpc.ini") -v, --version version of frpc ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Run frpc with a single udp proxy Usage: frpc udp [flags] Flags: --disable_log_color disable log color in console -h, --help help for udp -i, --local_ip string local ip (default "127.0.0.1") -l, --local_port int local port --log_file string console or file path (default "console") --log_level string log level (default "info") --log_max_days int log file reversed days (default 3) -p, --protocol string tcp or kcp or websocket (default "tcp") -n, --proxy_name string proxy name -r, --remote_port int remote port -s, --server_addr string frp server's address (default "127.0.0.1:7000") --tls_enable enable frpc tls -t, --token string auth token --uc use compression --ue use encryption -u, --user string user Global Flags: -c, --config string config file of frpc (default "./frpc.ini") -v, --version version of frpc ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Verify that the configures is valid Usage: frpc verify [flags] Flags: -h, --help help for verify Global Flags: -c, --config string config file of frpc (default "./frpc.ini") -v, --version version of frpc --End usages and flags-- 203[.]95[.]9[.]54 Ports 8443 TCP Whois Domain Name: pdsguam.biz Registry Domain ID: D15926452-BIZ Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com Registrar URL: whois.godaddy.com Updated Date: 2023-01-15T17:08:00Z Creation Date: 2007-01-10T00:40:37Z Registry Expiry Date: 2024-01-09T23:59:59Z Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC Registrar IANA ID: 146 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505 Registrant Organization: Domains By Proxy, LLC Registrant State/Province: Arizona Registrant Country: US Name Server: ns.pdsguam.biz Name Server: ns2.pdsguam.biz DNSSEC: unsigned Relationships 203[.]95[.]9[.]54 Connected_From 99b80c5ac352081a64129772ed5e1543d94cad708ba2adc46dc4ab7a0bd563f1 Description The IP address used to establish a connection with the remote FRPS. Relationship Summary edc0c63065... Connected_To 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 Connected_From edc0c63065e88ec96197c8d7a40662a15a812a9583dc6c82b18ecd7e43b13b70 99b80c5ac3... Connected_To 203[.]95[.]9[.]54 203[.]95[.]9[.]54 Connected_From 99b80c5ac352081a64129772ed5e1543d94cad708ba2adc46dc4ab7a0bd563f1 Recommendations CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts. Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines. Keep operating system patches up-to-date. Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication. Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required. Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes. Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known. Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests. Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers. Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header). Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content. Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.). Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing. Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs). Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops". Contact Information 1-888-282-0870 CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS) CISA SIPR (SIPRNET) CISA IC (JWICS) CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/ Document FAQ What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk. Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods: Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous) CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.

The time of year, when Cisco customers and partners converge for a week at Cisco Live, has come again! This is also a time for Cisco Customer Experience (CX) to celebrate the successes of our customers publicly with the Cisco CX Customer Hero Awards. I am always excited to recognize our CX Customer Hero Award winners, and even more so when our customers’ achievements become more and more impressive each year, all while building a better future with help from the Cisco Customer Experience (CX) team.

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

SiliconAngle reports that over 240,000 hosts are being identified by a Shodan search to be Confluence servers even though the total number of internet-exposed Confluence servers is only about 4,000.

Microsoft released the public preview of Face Check, which detects a user's liveness and compares appearance against existing documents such as a driver’s license to verify identity.

The systems that make up a smart city ecosystem are not easily secured and require better design and better policy to ensure they are not vulnerable.