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Today, CISA—with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), and international partners—released joint Cybersecurity Advisory Iranian Cyber Actors Brute Force and Credential Access Activity Compromises Critical Infrastructure. This advisory provides known indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by Iranian actors to impact organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors. Since October 2023, Iranian actors have used brute force and password spraying to compromise user accounts and obtain access to organizations in the healthcare and public health (HPH), government, information technology, engineering, and energy sectors. CISA and partners recommend critical infrastructure organizations follow the provided guidance, as well as ensure all accounts use strong passwords and register a second form of authentication. For more information on Iranian state-sponsored threat actor activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories page. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including more recommended baseline protections.

Today, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released joint guidance on Product Security Bad Practices, a part of CISA’s Secure by Design initiative. This joint guidance supplies an overview of exceptionally risky product security bad practices for software manufacturers who produce software in support of critical infrastructure or national critical functions. The bad practices presented in this guidance are organized into three categories: product properties, security features, and organizational processes and policies. This guidance contains brief information about specific bad practices, recommended actions, and additional resources. While this guidance is intended for software manufacturers who develop software products and services in support of critical infrastructure, all software manufacturers are strongly encouraged to avoid these product security bad practices. CISA and FBI urge software manufacturers to reduce customer risk by prioritizing security throughout the product development process. For more information and resources, visit CISA.gov/SecureByDesign. The public comment period begins today and concludes on December 2, 2024. During the comment period, members of the public can provide comments and feedback via the Federal Register.

Summary The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD's ACSC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to warn network defenders of Iranian cyber actors’ use of brute force and other techniques to compromise organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors, including the healthcare and public health (HPH), government, information technology, engineering, and energy sectors. The actors likely aim to obtain credentials and information describing the victim’s network that can then be sold to enable access to cybercriminals. Since October 2023, Iranian actors have used brute force, such as password spraying, and multifactor authentication (MFA) ‘push bombing’ to compromise user accounts and obtain access to organizations. The actors frequently modified MFA registrations, enabling persistent access. The actors performed discovery on the compromised networks to obtain additional credentials and identify other information that could be used to gain additional points of access. The authoring agencies assess the Iranian actors sell this information on cybercriminal forums to actors who may use the information to conduct additional malicious activity. This advisory provides the actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs). The information is derived from FBI engagements with entities impacted by this malicious activity. The authoring agencies recommend critical infrastructure organizations follow the guidance provided in the Mitigations section. At a minimum, organizations should ensure all accounts use strong passwords and register a second form of authentication. Download the PDF version of this report: AA24-290A Iranian Cyber Actors’ Brute Force and Credential Access Activity Compromises Critical Infrastructure Organizations (PDF, 794.32 KB ) For a downloadable list of IOCs, see: AA24-290A STIX XML (XML, 96.61 KB ) AA24-290A STIX JSON (JSON, 81.92 KB ) Technical Details Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK ® for Enterprise framework, version 15. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section in Appendix A for a table of the actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. Overview of Activity The actors likely conduct reconnaissance operations to gather victim identity [ T1589] information. Once obtained, the actors gain persistent access to victim networks frequently via brute force [ T1110]. After gaining access, the actors use a variety of techniques to further gather credentials, escalate privileges, and gain information about the entity’s systems and network. The actors also move laterally and download information that could assist other actors with access and exploitation. Initial Access and Persistence The actors use valid user and group email accounts [ T1078], frequently obtained via brute force such as password spraying [ T1110.003] although other times via unknown methods, to obtain initial access to Microsoft 365, Azure [ T1078.004], and Citrix systems [ T1133]. In some cases where push notification-based MFA was enabled, the actors send MFA requests to legitimate users seeking acceptance of the request. This technique—bombarding users with mobile phone push notifications until the user either approves the request by accident or stops the notifications— is known as “MFA fatigue” or “push bombing” [ T1621]. Once the threat actors gain access to an account, they frequently register their devices with MFA to protect their access to the environment via the valid account: In two confirmed compromises, the actors leveraged a compromised user’s open registration for MFA [ T1556.006] to register the actor’s own device [ T1098.005] to access the environment. In another confirmed compromise, the actors used a self-service password reset (SSPR) tool associated with a public facing Active Directory Federation Service (ADFS) to reset the accounts with expired passwords [ T1484.002] and then registered MFA through Okta for compromised accounts without MFA already enabled [ T1556] [ T1556.006]. The actors frequently conduct their activity using a virtual private network (VPN) service [ T1572]. Several of the IP addresses in the actors’ malicious activity originate from exit nodes tied to the Private Internet Access VPN service. Lateral Movement The actors use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement [ T1021.001]. In one instance, the actors used Microsoft Word to open PowerShell to launch the RDP binary mstsc.exe [ T1202 ]. Credential Access The actors likely use open-source tools and methodologies to gather more credentials. The actors performed Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN) enumeration of several service accounts and received Kerberos tickets [ T1558.003]. In one instance, the actors used the Active Directory (AD) Microsoft Graph Application Program Interface (API) PowerShell application likely to perform a directory dump of all AD accounts. Also, the actors imported the tool [ T1105] DomainPasswordSpray.ps1, which is openly available on GitHub [ T1588.002], likely to conduct password spraying. The actors also used the command Cmdkey /list, likely to display usernames and credentials [ T1555]. Privilege Escalation In one instance, the actors attempted impersonation of the domain controller, likely by exploiting Microsoft’s Netlogon (also known as ”Zerologon”) privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) [ T1068]. Discovery The actors leverage living off the land (LOTL) to gain knowledge about the target systems and internal networks. The actors used the following Windows command-line tools to gather information about domain controllers [ T1018], trusted domains [ T1482], lists of domain administrators, and enterprise administrators [ T1087.002] [ T1069.002] [ T1069.003]: Nltest /dclist Nltest /domain_trusts Nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts Net group “Enterprise admins” /domain Net group “Domain admins” /domain Next, the actors used the following Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) query in PowerShell [ T1059.001]to search the AD for computer display names, operating systems, descriptions, and distinguished names [ T1082]. $i=0 $D= [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain() $L='LDAP://' . $D $D = [ADSI]$L $Date = $((Get-Date).AddDays(-90).ToFileTime()) $str = '(&(objectcategory=computer)(operatingSystem=*serv*)(|(lastlogon>='+$Date+')(lastlogontimestamp>='+$Date+')))' $s = [adsisearcher]$str $s.searchRoot = $L.$D.distinguishedName $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('cn') > $Null $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('operatingsystem') > $Null $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('description') > $Null $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('distinguishedName') > $Null Foreach ($CA in $s.FindAll()) { Write-Host $CA.Properties.Item('cn') $CA.Properties.Item('operatingsystem') $CA. Properties.Item('description') $CA.Properties.Item('distinguishedName') $i++ } Write-host Total servers: $i Command and Control On one occasion, using msedge.exe, the actors likely made outbound connections to Cobalt Strike Beacon command and control (C2) infrastructure [ T1071.001]. Exfiltration and Collection In a couple instances, while logged in to victim accounts, the actors downloaded files related to gaining remote access to the organization and to the organization’s inventory [ T1005], likely exfiltrating the files to further persist in the victim network or to sell the information online. Detection To detect brute force activity, the authoring agencies recommend reviewing authentication logs for system and application login failures of valid accounts and looking for multiple, failed authentication attempts across all accounts. To detect the use of compromised credentials in combination with virtual infrastructure, the authoring agencies recommend the following steps: Look for “impossible logins,” such as suspicious logins with changing usernames, user agent strings, and IP address combinations or logins where IP addresses do not align to the user’s expected geographic location. Look for one IP used for multiple accounts, excluding expected logins. Look for “impossible travel.” Impossible travel occurs when a user logs in from multiple IP addresses with significant geographic distance (i.e., a person could not realistically travel between the geographic locations of the two IP addresses during the period between the logins). Note: Implementing this detection opportunity can result in false positives if legitimate users apply VPN solutions before connecting into networks. Look for MFA registrations with MFA in unexpected locales or from unfamiliar devices. Look for processes and program execution command-line arguments that may indicate credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the ntds.dit file from a domain controller. Look for suspicious privileged account use after resetting passwords or applying user account mitigations. Look for unusual activity in typically dormant accounts. Look for unusual user agent strings, such as strings not typically associated with normal user activity, which may indicate bot activity. Mitigations The authoring agencies recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve organizations’ cybersecurity posture based on the actors’ TTPs described in this advisory. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA. The CPGs, which are organized to align to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, are a subset of cybersecurity practices, aimed at meaningfully reducing risks to both critical infrastructure operations and the American people. These voluntary CPGs strive to help small- and medium-sized organizations kick-start their cybersecurity efforts by prioritizing investment in a limited number of essential actions with high-impact security outcomes. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections. Review IT helpdesk password management related to initial passwords, password resets for user lockouts, and shared accounts. IT helpdesk password procedures may not align to company policy for user verification or password strength, creating a security gap. Avoid common passwords (e.g. “Spring2024” or “Password123!”). Disable user accounts and access to organizational resources for departing staff [ CPG 2.D]. Disabling accounts can minimize system exposure, removing options actors can leverage for entry into the system. Similarly, create new user accounts as close as possible to an employee’s start date. Implement phishing-resistant MFA [ CPG 2.H]. See CISA’s resources Phishing-Resistant Multifactor Authentication and More than a Password for additional information on strengthening user credentials. Continuously review MFA settings to ensure coverage over all active, internet-facing protocols to ensure no exploitable services are exposed [ CPG 2.W]. Provide basic cybersecurity training to users [ CPG 2.I] covering concepts such as: Detecting unsuccessful login attempts [ CPG 2.G]. Having users deny MFA requests they have not generated. Ensuring users with MFA-enabled accounts have MFA set up appropriately. Ensure password policies align with the latest NIST Digital Identity Guidelines. Meeting the minimum password strength [ CPG 2.B] by creating a password using 8-64 nonstandard characters and long passphrases, when possible. Disable the use of RC4 for Kerberos authentication. These mitigations apply to critical infrastructure entities across sectors. The authoring agencies also recommend software manufacturers incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their software development practices to protect their customers against actors using compromised credentials, thereby strengthening the security posture of their customers. For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide. Validate Security Controls In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating organization security programs against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory. To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1 to Table 12). Align your security technologies against the technique. Test your technologies against the technique. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process. The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory. Contact Information Organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to: CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center [ report@cisa.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472)] or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov. Disclaimer The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the authoring agencies. Intrusion events connected to this Iranian group may also include a different set of cyber actors–likely the third-party actors who purchased access from the Iranian group via cybercriminal forums or other channels. As a result, some TTPs and IOCs noted in this advisory may be tied to these third-party actors, not the Iranian actors. The TTPs and IOCs are in the advisory to provide recipients the most complete picture of malicious activity that may be observed on compromised networks. However, exercise caution if formulating attribution assessments based solely on matching TTPs and IOCs. Version History October 16, 2024: Initial version. Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques See Tables 1–12 for all referenced actors’ tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool. Table 1: Reconnaissance Technique Title ID Use Gather Victim Identity Information T1589 The actors likely gathered victim information. Table 2: Resource Development Technique Title ID Use Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1588.002 The actors obtained a password spray tool through an open-source repository. Table 3: Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 The actors used password spraying to obtain valid user and group email account credentials, allowing them access to the network. Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1078.004 The actors used accounts hosted on Microsoft 365, Azure, and Okta cloud environments as additional methods for initial access. External Remote Services T1133 The actors exploited Citrix systems’ external-facing remote services as another method for gaining initial access to the system. Table 4: Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 The actors used PowerShell commands to maintain and expand access. Table 5: Persistence Technique Title ID Use Account Manipulation: Device Registration T1098.005 The actors used PowerShell commands to maintain and expand access. Modify Authentication Process T1556 The actors used a public facing Active Directory Federation Service (ADFS) domain to reset the passwords of expired accounts. Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication T1556.006 The actors used an MFA bypass method, such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, providing the ability to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. Table 6: Privilege Escalation Technique Title ID Use Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068 The actors attempted impersonation of the domain controller likely by exploiting CVE-2020-1472, Microsoft’s Netlogon Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification T1484.002 The actors leveraged a public-facing ADFS password reset tool to reactivate inactive accounts, allowing the actor to authenticate and enroll their devices as any user in the AD managed by the victim tenant. Table 7: Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Indirect Command Execution T1202 The actors attempted impersonation of the Domain Controller likely by exploiting CVE-2020-1472, Microsoft’s Netlogon Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Table 8: Credential Access Technique Title ID Use Brute Force: Password Spraying T1110.003 The actors targeted applications, including Single Sign-on (SSO) Microsoft Office 365, using brute force password sprays and imported the tool DomainPasswordSpray.ps1. Credentials from Password Stores T1555 The actors used the command Cmdkey /list likely to display usernames and credentials. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting T1558.003 The actors performed Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN) enumeration of several service accounts and received Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) tickets. Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation T1621 The actors sent MFA requests to legitimate users. Table 9: Discovery Technique Title ID Use Remote System Discovery T1018 The actors used LOTL to return information about domain controllers. Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups T1069.002 The actors used LOTL to return lists of domain administrators and enterprise administrators. Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups T1069.003 The actors used LOTL to return lists of domain administrators and enterprise administrators. System Information Discovery T1082 The actors were able to query the AD to discover display names, operating systems, descriptions, and distinguished names from the computer. Account Discovery: Domain Account T1087.002 The actors used LOTL to return lists of domain administrators and enterprise administrators. Domain Trust Discovery T1482 The actors used LOTL to return information about trusted domains. Table 10: Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001 The actors used Microsoft Word to open PowerShell to launch RDP binary mstsc.exe. Table 11: Collection Technique Title ID Use Data from Local System T1005 The actors downloaded files related to remote access methods and the organization’s inventory. Table 12: Command and Control Technique Title ID Use Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 The actors used msedge.exe to make outbound connections likely to Cobalt Strike Beacon C2 infrastructure. Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 The actors imported a tool from GitHub and used it to conduct password spraying. Protocol Tunneling T1572 The actors frequently conduct targeting using a virtual private network (VPN). Appendix B: Indicators of Compromise See Tables 13 to 15 for IOCs obtained from FBI investigations. Table 13: Malicious Files Associated with Iranian Cyber Actors Hash Description 1F96D15B26416B2C7043EE7172357AF3AFBB002A Associated with malicious activity. 3D3CDF7CFC881678FEBCAFB26AE423FE5AA4EFEC Associated with malicious activity. Disclaimer: The authoring organizations recommend network defenders investigate or vet IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking, as many cyber actors are known to change IP addresses, sometimes daily, and some IP addresses may host valid domains. Many of the IP addresses provided below are assessed VPN nodes and as such are not exclusive to the Iranian actors’ use. The authoring organizations do not recommend blocking these IP addresses based solely on their inclusion in this JCSA. The authoring organizations recommend using the below IP addresses to search for previous activity the actors may have conducted against networks. If positive hits for these IP addresses are identified, the authoring organizations recommend making an independent determination if the observed activity aligns with the TTPs outlined in the JCSA. The timeframes included in the table reflect the timeframe the actors likely used the IPs. Table 14: Network Indicators IP Address Date Range 95.181.234.12 01/30/2024 to 02/07/2024 95.181.234.25 01/30/2024 to 02/07/2024 173.239.232.20 10/06/2023 to 12/19/2023 172.98.71.191 10/15/2023 to 11/27/2023 102.129.235.127 10/21/2023 to 10/22/2023 188.126.94.60 10/22/2023 to 01/12/2024 149.40.50.45 10/26/2023 181.214.166.59 10/26/2023 212.102.39.212 10/26/2023 149.57.16.134 10/26/2023 to 10/27/2023 149.57.16.137 10/26/2023 to 10/27/2023 102.129.235.186 10/29/2023 to 11/08/2023 46.246.8.138 10/31/2023 to 01/26/2024 149.57.16.160 11/08/2023 149.57.16.37 11/08/2023 46.246.8.137 11/17/2023 to 01/25/2024 212.102.57.29 11/19/2023 to 01/17/2024 46.246.8.82 11/22/2023 to 01/28/2024 95.181.234.15 11/26/2023 to 02/07/2024 45.88.97.225 11/27/2023 to 02/11/2024 84.239.45.17 12/04/2023 to 12/07/2023 46.246.8.104 12/07/2023 to 02/07/2024 37.46.113.206 12/07/2023 46.246.3.186 12/07/2023 to 12/09/2023 46.246.8.141 12/07/2023 to 02/10/2024 46.246.8.17 12/09/2023 to 01/09/2024 37.19.197.182 12/15/2023 154.16.192.38 12/25/2023 to 01/24/2024 102.165.16.127 12/27/2023 to 01/28/2024 46.246.8.47 12/29/2023 to 01/29/2024 46.246.3.225 12/30/2023 to 02/06/2024 46.246.3.226 12/31/2023 to 02/03/2024 46.246.3.240 12/31/2023 to 02/06/2024 191.101.217.10 01/05/2024 102.129.153.182 01/08/2024 46.246.3.196 01/08/2024 102.129.152.60 01/09/2024 156.146.60.74 01/10/2024 191.96.227.113 01/10/2024 191.96.227.122 01/10/2024 181.214.166.132 01/11/2024 188.126.94.57 01/11/2024 to 01/13/2024 154.6.13.144 01/13/2024 to 01/24/2024 154.6.13.151 01/13/2024 to 01/28/2024 188.126.94.166 01/15/2024 89.149.38.204 01/18/2024 46.246.8.67 01/20/2024 46.246.8.53 01/22/2024 154.16.192.37 01/24/2024 191.96.150.14 01/24/2024 191.96.150.96 01/24/2024 46.246.8.10 01/24/2024 84.239.25.13 01/24/2024 154.6.13.139 01/26/2024 191.96.106.33 01/26/2024 191.96.227.159 01/26/2024 149.57.16.150 01/27/2024 191.96.150.21 01/27/2024 46.246.8.84 01/27/2024 95.181.235.8 01/27/2024 191.96.227.102 01/27/2024 to 01/28/2024 46.246.122.185 01/28/2024 146.70.102.3 01/29/2024 to 01/30/2024 46.246.3.233 01/30/2024 to 02/15/2024 46.246.3.239 01/30/2024 to 02/15/2024 188.126.89.35 02/03/2024 46.246.3.223 02/03/2024 46.246.3.245 02/05/2024 to 02/06/2024 191.96.150.50 02/09/2024 Table 15: Devices Device Type Description Samsung Galaxy A71 (SM-A715F) Registered with MFA Samsung SM-G998B Registered with MFA Samsung SM-M205F Registered with MFA

The long-active, India-sponsored cyber-threat group targeted multiple entities across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and even Europe in a recent attack wave that demonstrated the use of a previously unknown post-exploit tool called StealerBot.

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